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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of two studies related to internal capital markets and
bank relationship using Japanese corporate spin-offs. The first study analyzes the
relation between internal capital markets and banks by examining 137 Japanese corporate
spin-offs created between the years 2001 and 2003 (since the establishment of new spinoffs law in 2001). In a univariate analysis, we find significant positive average
cumulative abnormal returns around the announcements, market-adjusted excess returns
after the spin-offs, an increase of the Herfindahl index, and a reduction in the
diversification discount after the spin-offs. In a cross-sectional analysis, we find that
bank-related governance variables such as the keiretsu-affiliation indicator, bank loan to
total asset ratio, main bank ownership, and indicator variable of the existence of a bankappointed director on the board indicator variables are significantly positively related to
cumulative average abnormal returns around the announcements, market-adjusted excess
returns after the spin-offs, an increase in focus of firms in terms of the Herfindahl index,
and a reduction in the diversification discount. Therefore, we conclude that there is a
significant relationship between internal capital markets and banks in Japan; after the
internal capital market reorganization through spin-offs the closer relationship with banks
creates shareholder wealth and increases the focus of firms. This paper is now coauthored with Professor Yoon K. Choi.
The second study analyzes the investment policy changes in internal capital
markets and the effect of banks’ monitoring on the investment changes using Japanese
corporate spin-offs, including merger-facilitated spin-offs within conglomerates. We find
that investment sensitivity increases significantly after internal restructuring through
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spin-offs, consistent with Gertner et al. (2002). Furthermore, our results show that bankrelated spin-offs’ investments are more sensitive to investment opportunities, Tobin’s Q,
after being spun off. This suggests that the efficiency of Japanese internal capital
markets has increased through spin-offs after the financial deregulation in 2001. We
conclude that banks seem to play significant monitoring roles in internal capital markets
to increase the investment efficiency after spin-offs. This paper is now co-authored with
Professor Yoon K. Choi.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This study examines whether the Japanese spin-offs create values for shareholders
and increase the efficiency of internal capital markets. Furthermore, this study
investigates the efficiency changes in internal capital markets and the impact of banks’
monitoring in internal capital markets using Japanese corporate spin-offs. Unlike other
divestitures such as equity carve-outs or asset sales, spin-offs do not generate cash for the
parent and the spun-off. Because of the non-cash-generating features, spin-offs provide
well-furnished natural experimental setting for internal capital market analysis. In
addition, the Japanese spin-offs are purely internal transactions. Therefore, the Japanese
spin-offs are well-furnished experimental setting for testing the relationship between
internal capital markets and banks. We find that the efficiency of internal capital markets
are significantly related to bank relationships. Thus, we conclude that banks seem to play
a significant monitoring role in internal capital markets.

Study One
Internal Capital Markets and Bank Relationship
-Evidence from Japanese Corporate Spin-offs
Study one focuses on the Japanese corporate spin-offs and investigates the
relationship between the efficiency of the internal capital markets and the roles of banks.
The Japanese spin-offs dataset provides a unique setting because the banks play a critical
role in the Japanese corporate structure and also the Japanese spin-offs are quite different
from the U.S. spin-offs. In the Japanese spin-offs, a division becomes a new subsidiary,
but still remains under the control of the parent company, and thus its overall governance
1

structure does not change. These restructurings are a purely internal transaction. This
has in important implication for the study of internal capital markets. We can examine
the effect of corporate restructuring on the efficiency of internal capital market without
changing the ownership and control structure. We elaborate on this issue when we
discuss the details of the Japanese spin-offs
Furthermore, this paper hypothesizes that banks can increase the efficiency of the
internal capital market as the most informed external capital suppliers and monitors of
firms. A vast array of literature in banking discusses the uniqueness of banks and their
long-run relationships with their client firms, which characterize the difference between
banks and other financial entities. The crucial roles of banks are to resolve the
information asymmetries and agency problems between investors and firms.
Consequently, the role of banks is instrumental in overcoming the inefficiency of internal
capital markets. It is well-known that the Japanese corporate structure is governed by
bank-centered relationship.

Study Two
Internal Capital Markets, Investment, and Bank Relationship
- Evidence from Japanese Corporate Spin-offs
Investment policy of internal capital markets affects the efficiency of internal
capital markets. Internal capital markets are inefficient if cross-subsidization across
divisions is not systematic: Capital of a firm may be misallocated from divisions with
good investment opportunities to divisions with bad investment opportunities. Spin-offs
literature analyzes how firms increase efficiency of investment policy in internal capital

2

markets through spin-offs.1 Spin-offs allow us to examine the investment policy changes
in internal capital markets because firms’ capital is reallocated through spin-offs.
This study focuses on the Japanese corporate spin-offs to investigate the
relationship between internal capital markets’ efficiency of investment changes and banks.
The Japanese spin-offs dataset provides a unique setting since the banks play a critical
role in the Japanese corporate structure and also the Japanese spin-offs are purely internal
transaction.2 Diamond (1984, 1991), among others, argues that banks monitor their client
firms: We suggest that bank play such a role in internal capital market to ensure the
efficient investment decisions.
Our empirical analysis is similar to Gertner et al.’s (2002) Tobin’s Q investment
sensitivity analysis using panel data set of Japanese spin-offs. Based on the parent firms’
bank related governance structure, we divide our sample into dichotomous settings, either
bank-related or non-bank-related; keiretsu-affiliation, existence of bank-appointed
directors, and bank or main bank ownership dummy variables (below- or above- sample
median). We find consistent results with Gertner et al. (2002) that investment sensitivity
increases after internal restructuring through spin-offs. Further more, our results show
that bank-related spin-offs’ investments are more sensitive to investment opportunities,
Tobin’s Q. This suggests that banks increase the investment efficiency of internal capital
market after spin-offs as the most informed monitors. This result is consistent with the
findings of Shin and Park (1999) that there is positive relationship between investment

1

Gertner et al. (2002) show increase in investment sensitivity after spin-offs using spun-off divisions data,
Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) examine effect of divestitures in investment of parent firms, and Ahn and
Denis (2004) study the changes of investment policy for the combined firm of parent and spun-offs.
2
See Choi and Han (2005) for detail.
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and investment opportunities where independent firms do not. Also, Khanna and Palepu
(2000) show that internal capital market of Indian business group affiliated firms is more
efficient compared to non-affiliated firms.

Overall Contribution
Taken together, studies one and two of this dissertation provide several significant
contributions. First, and for most, this dissertation contributes to the internal capital
markets literature from the angle of the uniqueness of banks and complements the
monitoring role of the Japanese main bank literature. Kang, Shivdasani, and Yamada
(2000) study Japanese domestic mergers in Japan, and show that the close bank
relationship creates shareholder wealth and improves the investment efficiency.3 We
provide evidence on the monitoring role of Japanese banks in internal capital markets,
and show consistent results with Kang, Shivdasani, and Yamada (2000).
Second, this dissertation provides empirical evidence on the functions of
Japanese corporate spin-offs not only create value for shareholders but also bring
efficiency in internal capital markets. All these empirical findings are related to recent
deregulation of Japanese financial markets. Deregulations through amendments of
commercial codes are generally expected to bring efficiency in the market as an outcome
of corporate efficiency. This dissertation tests whether a financial deregulation improves
the efficiency of financial markets. The results of this dissertation provide empirical
evidence to the mixed arguments on efficiency of internal capital markets.
3

In the similar vein, Kaplan (1994), Kaplan and Minton (1994), and Kang and Shivdasani (1995, 1997)
document the significant monitoring roles of Japanese banks.

4

Finally, this dissertation also suggests that bank related firms improve their
investment efficiency of internal capital markets through spin-offs. Remaining of this
dissertation will discuss the details of empirical findings.
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STUDY ONE
INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND BANK RELATIONSHIP
- EVDIENCE FROM JAPANESE CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS
Spin-offs are defined in the literature as a form of corporate divestiture in which a
parent company separates one of its subsidiaries into an independent, publicly traded
company and the new stocks from this independent company are distributed on a pro rata
basis to the parent company’s shareholders. Unlike other divestitures such as equity
carve-outs or asset sales, spin-offs do not generate cash for the parent or the spun-off
company. Because of this non-cash-generating feature, spin-offs provide a wellfurnished natural experimental setting for internal capital market analysis. Some argue
that inefficiently diversified firms are valued at a relative discount when compared with a
portfolio of stand alone firms because of inefficient internal capital markets. Others
argue that internal capital markets are efficient if headquarters oversees a small and
focused set of projects (Stein(1997)).
This study focuses on the Japanese corporate spin-offs and investigates the
relationship between the efficiency of the internal capital markets and the roles of banks.
The Japanese spin-offs are interesting to examine given that banks play a critical role in
Japanese corporate structure and also that Japanese spin-offs are quite different from U.S.
spin-offs. In the case of Japanese spin-offs, a division becomes a new subsidiary but still
remains under the control of the parent company, and thus its overall governance
structure does not change. Any restructuring that takes place is purely an internal
transaction. This has in important implication for the study of internal capital markets.
That is, the situation of Japanese spin-offs allows us to examine the effect of corporate
12

restructuring on the efficiency of the internal capital market without changing the
ownership and control structure. We later elaborate on this issue when we discuss the
details of the Japanese spin-offs.
Furthermore, this paper hypothesizes that banks can increase the efficiency of
internal capital markets, which serve as the most informed external capital suppliers and
monitors of firms. A vast array of literature in banking discusses the uniqueness of banks
and their long-term relationships with their client firms and characterizes the difference
between banks and other financial entities.4 A crucial role of banks is to resolve
information asymmetries and agency problems that develop between investors and firms.
Consequently, banks are instrumental in overcoming the inefficiency of internal capital
markets. It is well-known that the Japanese corporate structure is governed by bankcentered relationships.
We investigate the 137 Japanese corporate spin-offs created between 2001 and
2003 (since the establishment of the new Japanese corporate spin-offs law in April 2001).
On April 1, 2001, the new Spin-offs Law became effective in Japan, and many firms
started using the spin-offs in their reorganizations. We find that there are significant
positive abnormal returns around the announcement, significant positive market-adjusted
returns after the spin-offs, a significant increase in focus of firms in terms of the
Herfindahl index, and a significant reduction in the diversification discount. In crosssectional analyses, announcement abnormal returns, post-spin-offs performance,

4

Diamond (1984) and Fama (1985) argue that banks are unique because they have information that is not
available to other external capital markets. Diamond (1991) argues that banks’ information on client
companies allows banks to monitor these firms, while Lummer and McConnell (1989) argue that banks are
important and credible transmitters of firm-specific information to the capital market.
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Herfindahl index increases, and reduction in the diversification discount are significantly
positively related to bank relationship variables such as main bank, keiretsu-affiliation,
bank ownership, and existence of bank-appointed directors.
Internal capital markets literature reports that after spin-offs are completed, the
efficiency of the firm increases significantly. Desai and Jain (1999) find that both
announcement period and long-term abnormal returns for the focus-increasing spin-offs
are significantly larger than those of non-focus-increasing spin-offs. Gertner, Power, and
Scharfstein (2002) show that spin-offs improve the allocation of capital by using the
spun-off companies’ data. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) show that divestiture reduces
the diversification discount and increases the efficiency of segment investment. Ahn and
Denis (2004) show that there is a significant increase in investment efficiency, while the
diversification discount is eliminated after spin-offs.
This study also contributes to the internal capital market literature from the angle
of the uniqueness of banks and complements the literature that focuses on the monitoring
role of the Japanese main bank. Kang, Shivdasani, and Yamada (2000) study Japanese
domestic mergers in Japan and show that the close relationship between banks and firms
creates shareholder wealth and improves the investment efficiency.5 We provide
evidence on the monitoring role of Japanese banks in internal capital markets, and show
consistent results with Kang, Shivdasani, and Yamada (2000).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide the
background on the Japanese spin-offs examined. In Section 3, we describe the data and
5

In the similar vein, Kaplan (1994), Kaplan and Minton (1994), and Kang and Shivdasani (1995, 1997)
document the significant monitoring roles of Japanese banks.
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descriptive statistics of Japanese corporate spin-offs. In Sections 4 and 5, we analyze and
interpret the empirical results. Section 6 summarizes the major tenets of our arguments.

Japanese Corporate Spin-offs
The Japanese economy and its financial markets have been stumbling for the past
decade after the collapse of the bubble economy in the late 1980s. Since then, to
reinvigorate the economy, the Japanese government has tried a wide range of
deregulations through numerous revisions of the commercial codes. In 1997, merger
procedures were simplified, and the Revision of the Antimonopoly Law allowed
establishment of pure holding companies, which had been banned since 1947. In 1999,
in conjunction with the simplified merger procedures and Antimonopoly Law, a stock
swap system and stock transfer system were created to facilitate transactions between
wholly-owned subsidiaries and their parent companies. The 2000 Amendment of the
Commercial Code introduced the procedures for a company split-up so as to make the
restructuring through spin-offs or divestitures easier. On April 1, 2001, a new spin-off
law came into effect, and, owing to the benefits of this new law, many Japanese firms
chose to restructure and became involved in the spin-offs for their corporate
restructurings. Spin-offs are end-result of commercial codes revisions of the Japanese
capital market in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Thus, the various revisions of
relating to stock repurchases, holding companies, and simplified mergers and spin-offs
have not only made the legal framework for spin-offs more in tune with the demands of

15

Japan’s internationalized capital markets, but they have also made executives of Japanese
corporations more conscious of corporate value.6
Around the time of the Asian financial crisis at the end of the 1990s, Japanese
corporations and the Japanese government had started to realize the need for corporate
reorganizations, such as spin-offs or other divestitures, to improve the flexibility and
efficiency of their corporate structures in the competitive international capital market.
The institutional legal framework for Japanese corporate spin-offs began to change in
1997, and many Japanese multi-divisional firms reorganized their internal capital markets
by transforming divisions into independent units such as wholly-owned subsidiaries or
spun-offs to obtain optimal internal capital market structure. Before the enactment of the
new corporate spin-offs law in April 2001, Japanese firms were required to be inspected
by the federal court before doing the spin-offs. They also needed to obtain an individual
approval from creditors for the transfer of liabilities and assets, which impeded the
flexible corporate restructuring. The new commercial code revision in 2001 simplified
that procedure. In addition, before the new law was enacted, cash transactions were
required; however, the new law allowed easier transactions accompanied by the stock
swap and stock transfer systems changes in 1999. Consequently, it became easier for
firms to choose their optimal corporate structure by using the new corporate spin-offs
laws.
A widely-accepted definition in the literature of a spin-off is a case in which a
parent company transfers a part of its assets to a newly created, independent company

6

Japan Investor Relations and Investor Support, Inc. Research Newsletter, Issue No.1, December 2001
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(usually a former subsidiary of the parent company), which then goes public. The new
company’s stocks are then distributed to the parent company’s shareholders at a pro rata
base. There are four different types of the Japanese spin-offs in terms of spun-off’s stock
distributions. First, the most commonly used method is to transfer the spun-off’s stocks
to the parent company after the spin-off has taken place, which is technically similar to
wholly-owned subsidiary. The second method is identical to the traditional process of
spin-offs mentioned above. These two categories of Japanese spin-offs are subdivided
into two different types in terms of the purpose of the spin-offs. One type separates
divisions in order to facilitate mergers either within the group or between the groups of
companies. In this case, the spin-off company announces the spin-offs and mergers at the
same time; on the execution date these two transactions are completed simultaneously.
The other type of spin-off is creating new companies by separating divisions from the
parent company.

Literature Review
Internal Capital Markets

Literature on efficiency of internal capital markets has mixed arguments. Lamont
(1997) and Shin, and Stulz (1998) argue for inefficiency of internal capital markets
because of inefficient cross-subsidization across the divisions. Thus inefficient internal
capital markets literature argues that diversified firms misallocate the capital to poorly
performing divisions. Rajan, Scharfstein, and Stein (2000) argue that rent-seeking
behavior within the conglomerate worsens the diversified discount. Lins and
17

Servaes’(1999) documents the international evidence on diversification discount for
Germany, Japan, and United Kingdom. They find that the Japanese and UK corporations
have significant diversification discount while German corporations do not.
In contrast, Matsusaka and Nanda (2002) and Stein (1997) argue for the
efficiency of internal capital markets. Stein (1997) diversified firms reduce the cost of
financing and asymmetric information compared to stand alone firms because
headquarters has information while other external entities do not.

Internal Capital Markets and Spin-offs

Desai and Jain (1999) find that both the announcement period and long-run
abnormal returns for the focus-increasing spin-offs are significantly larger than those for
non-focus-increasing spin-offs. Gertner, Power, and Scharfstein (2002) show that spinoffs improve the efficiency of capital allocation through spin-offs; these results are found
primarily in the industries where the parent and spin-off firms are unrelated and in spinoffs where announcement returns are higher. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) show that
divestiture reduces the diversification discount and increases the efficiency of segment
investment, suggesting that inefficient investment is partly responsible for the
diversification discount and supporting the corporate focus and financing hypothesis.
Ahn and Denis (2004) study the changes of investment policy for the combined firm of
parent and spun-off companies.
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Japanese Banks

There are four major bank-oriented Japanese corporate governance systems in
existence: the main bank, bank-centered groups called keiretsu, bank ownership of firms
and bank-sent managers. The main banks are typically the major lenders to firms and
play the role of information controller and monitor of the firm, intervening in financial
decisions. Among others, Hoshi et al. (1990) find that firms with a close relation with
main banks are less liquidity constrained. Also, main banks organize rescue programs
when their client firms become financially distressed, and this insurance role leads them
to monitor the firm more closely. Kang and Shivdasani (1995) find that poorly
performing firms are more likely associated with higher CEO turnovers when firms have
a close relationship with main banks. Kang et al. (2000) show that there is a significant
positive relationship between the announcement returns of Japanese mergers and the loan
amount from main bank. They suggest that Japanese banks, as debt holders, perform an
important monitoring function.
Keiretsu 7 refers to a bank-centered long-term transactional relationship linked by
“stable inter-corporate shareholding”8 between firms (Morck and Nakamura(1999)).
Hoshi et al. (1990) find that the insurance and monitoring roles are more evident with
keiretsu-affiliated firms. Thus, bank-related Japanese corporate governance enhances the
unique equity ownership structure, which involves cross shareholdings between

7

There are eight horizontal industrial groups in Japan, which are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Sanwa,
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Fuyo, Tokai, and Industrial Bank of Japan.
8
Morck and Nakamura (1999) define ‘stable shareholders’ as those who almost never sell out and
consistently support management.
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industrial firms and banks.9 Morck et al. (2000) find that there is a non-linear
relationship between main bank ownership and firm value, showing that at low levels of
ownership by main banks, firm value decreases as ownership increases, and the opposite
is shown sometimes at higher levels. Lastly, sometimes, Japanese banks appoint bankers
to the board of firms for the purpose of managerial interventions and monitoring. Kaplan
and Minton (1995) find that if there is a bank-appointed director in the board, there is
more frequent executive turnover when firms perform poorly.

Methodology
Event Study

An event study measures the impact of a specific event on the value of a firm
using financial market data. This is typically used with events relating to common stock
returns, however, other securities can be used such as bond price returns. The measure of
an abnormal stock return is the key ingredient of an event study. It is a very popular and
useful technique due to the fact that, given the efficiency of the market, the effect of an
event is reflected in security prices almost immediately. Hence, a measure of the event’s
economic impact can be set using security prices observed over a relatively short time
period. The procedure for such a study involves the specification of the event that could
include such examples as quarterly earnings reports or corporate mergers. Also the event
time frame must be specified which usually includes time prior to and after an event. The

9

Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000) explain the origins of Japanese bank ownership in detail.
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first event study was conducted by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969); it was an
analysis of the effect of stock splits on firm value.
If an event has an impact on security prices, we should observe significant
abnormal return on the securities of interest on or around the event date. The measure of
the events abnormal stock return is basically equal to the actual return minus normal
return over a given time period. There are many ways to measure abnormal returns. The
normal return can use market returns or the constant mean return model, which uses a
linear relationship between the market return and the security return. Brown and Warner
(1985) discuss three ways to measure abnormal stock returns that are used very often.
The first one is to calculate mean-adjusted returns. The abnormal return in this
case is measured as the difference between the return on the event date and the average
daily return on the asset over some estimation period (usually 250 trading days, or a year).
The second method uses the market-adjusted return which is calculated as the difference
between the asset and market index returns on day t (event date). The third way is to use
the OLS market model: Ai,t = Ri,t – αi – βiRm,t , where Ai,t is the abnormal return on day t,
Ri,t – the total security return on day t, αi and βi are OLS values from the estimation
period. These market returns involve market risk associated with its security compared to
the market (Beta). Market returns are typically a better measure for normal returns vs.
the constant mean return model. Recent studies have shown abnormal returns during
earnings releases, corporate spin offs, how a company raises capital, stock splits, and
mergers and acquisitions. This study uses market model. The market model parameters
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are estimated using continuously compounded returns for the 258-day period, starting
258 days before the spin-offs announcement date and (-1,0) event window is used

Long Term Market-Adjusted Abnormal Returns

We evaluate the post-spin-offs market-adjusted long-term abnormal returns using
a method similar to that of Spiess and Graves (1995). The market-adjusted returns for
company i in t months after the ex-date are defined as
ari,t = ri,t – rmkt, t
where ri,t is return of the company i in month t, and rmkt, t is Nikkei 225 Stock Average
Index in month t. The average market-adjusted return from the ex-date month to time t is
calculated as
ARi,t =

1
n

n

∑

ari,t

t =1

Herfindahl Index

The Herfindahl index measures the degree of corporate focus. Desai and Jain
(1999) classify a spin-off to be a focus-increasing spin-off if the Herfindahl index
increases after the spin-off compared to the year before the spin-off. A sales-based
Herfindahl index, Hjt, calculates the degree which sales are concentrated in a few of a
firm’s segment. It is calculated across Njt segments for the j th firms in fiscal year t as the
sum squares of each segment’s sales as a proportion of total sales:
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Njt

Hjt =

∑
i =1

Njt

[( Xij / ∑ Xijt )] 2
i =1

Where Xjt is the sales attribute to a segment. Changes in focus is calculated difference
between Hj,1 and Hj,-1.

Diversification Discount

This paper finds the significant diversification discount on the value of spin-offs
samples of Japanese firms. This result is consistent with Lins and Servaes’(1999)
findings when they examine the international evidence on diversification discount for
Germany, Japan, and United Kingdom. They find that the Japanese and UK corporations
have a significant diversification discount while German corporations do not. However,
the diversification discount can be reduced or eliminated through internal capital market
restructuring such as spin-offs (Ahn and Denis, 2004; Gertner et al., 2002; Desai and Jain,
1999). We find that the diversification discounts in the Japanese firms are significantly
reduced after the spin-offs. Furthermore, the degree of reduction in diversification
discount is positively related to the firms’ relationship with the bank. This paper follows
Lins and Servaes’ (1999) diversification discount measurement, which is similar to that
of Berger and Ofek (1995). Berger and Ofek(1995) define diversification discount
(Discount) and multiplier estimation of imputed value, I(V), as follows:
DISCOUNT = ln(V/I(V)),
I(V) =

n

∑

(1)

SALESi*(Indi(V/SALES)mf)

i =1
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(2)

where
DISCOUNT
I(V)

= firm’s diversification discount
= imputed value of the sum of a firm’s segment as stand-alone
firms,

SALESi

= segment i’s sales,

Indi(V/SALES)mf

= multiple of total capital to sales for the median single-segment
firm in segment i’s industry

V

= firm’s total capital (market value of common equity plus book
value of debt)

n

= total number of segments in segment i’s firm.

Equation (1) shows that the firm’s diversification discount is the natural logarithm of the
ratio of the firm’s actual value to its imputed value. Equation (2) indicates that the firm’s
imputed value is the sum of segment-imputed values, which are obtained by multiplying
an industry median multiplier of total capital to sales by the segment’s level.

Data and Sample Selection
We collect the sample of Japanese corporate spin-offs announced from January 1,
2001 through December 31, 2003 and completed since the effective date of the new
corporate spin-offs law in April 2001. The data source is Merger and Acquisition
Research Report (MARR, Tokyo) published by RECOFF CO., which is the largest M&A
data service provider in Japan. MARR lists the announcement dates of spin-offs, names
of parent and spun-off companies, and major industries of parent and spun-off companies.
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In addition, we search for spin-off news in four major Japanese financial papers: Nihon
Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Economic Journal), Nihon Keizai Sangyo Shimbun (Nikkei
Industrial Journal), Nihon Keizai Ryutuu Shimbun (Nikkei Distribution Journal), and
Nihon Keizai Kinyuu Shimbun (Nikkei Finance Journal). Bank-centered industrial groups,
keiretsu, are identified from Industrial Groupings in Japan 2001, published by Dodwell
Marketing Consultants.10 We restrict the sample to the firms listed in the First or the
Second section of Tokyo Stock Exchange prior to the spin-off event year.11 We retrieve
main bank information, bank ownership data, and consolidated bank loan amount data
between 2000 and 2003 from the autumn issue of the Japan Company Handbook.
Specific bank loan data and end-of-fiscal-year financial information are collected from
the Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS), Japan Company Handbook,
and Worldscope. These financial data are based on consolidated financial statements,
which evaluate the performance of the business group as a whole, including spun-offs
and related units. Daily stock prices, as reflected in the daily Nikkei Average Index is
retrieved from NEEDS.
Initial spin-off data consisted of observations made between 2001 and 2003; we
exclude merger-facilitated spin-offs.12 The sample also excludes 10 companies,
including 6 real estate, 2 financial, and 2 utility companies. Additionally, 11 of the
remaining samples are eliminated because they are related to firms spinning off more

10

Hoshi et al. (1990 & 1991) use this publication for identifying the Keiretsu-affiliated firms.
Japan Company Handbook contains the First and Second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s listed
firms’ firm specific information and financial data including name of the main bank, bank ownership, and
bank loan amount data.
12
For M&A facilitated spin-offs, we obtain the spin-offs completion dates, M&A completion dates, and
new company’s name.
11

25

than one division. Thus, the final sample includes 137 spin-off events. Table 1 describes
the annual frequency of Japanese corporate spin-offs by keiretsu-affiliation of the parent
firms. The non-keiretsu-affiliated firms are more frequently involved in corporate spinoffs during the sample period. Also, the annual frequency of spin-offs increased
significantly from 36 in the first year (2001) to 73 in 2002 and 52 in 2003. Using the 40
MARR industry classifications, Table 2 shows the frequency of focus-increasing and
non-focus-increasing spin-offs of parent companies by keiretsu-affiliation. If the parent
company and its subsidiaries are in different industries, then the spin-off is considered to
be focus-increasing. It seems spin-offs are wide spread across different types of spin-offs
without any noticeable patterns. Table 3 shows the summary statistics of firm
characteristics and bank governance variables. Banks as a whole own about 20% of
equity, while main banks own approximately 6% on average. Almost 40% of the sample
firms are affiliated with keiretsu. Finally, about 62% of the sample firms have bankappointed directors.

Empirical Results
Announcement Abnormal Returns

Table 4 shows the two-day average cumulative abnormal returns for parent firms around
the spin-offs announcement. The cumulative abnormal returns of spin-offs
announcements are calculated based on the market model. The market model parameters
are estimated from 258 days to 11 days before the spin-offs announcement date, using the
Nikkei 225 Stock Average Index as a market proxy. The cumulative abnormal returns are
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calculated around the announcement date window of (-1, 0). On average, the whole
sample shows 1.71% of positive abnormal returns at the 5% significance level. Keiretsuaffiliated spin-offs show 4.68% positive abnormal returns at the 1% significance level.
However, non-keiretsu-affiliated spin-offs do not show significant abnormal returns.
Both focus-increasing and non-focus-increasing spin-offs show 2.61% and 0.94%
abnormal returns at the 1% and 10% significance level. This is consistent with the focusincreasing hypothesis that focus-increasing spin-offs have significant abnormal returns,
higher than those of non-focus-increasing spin-offs. Even the non-focus-increasing spinoffs show significant positive returns, picked by the keiretsu-affiliated firms. Therefore,
the bank-centered industrial groups seem to play significant monitoring role in the prespin-off stages in the Japanese corporate spin-off market. The focus-increasing spin-offs
by keiretsu-affiliated firms show the highest abnormal returns, 8.01%, which is consistent
with the role of banks as efficient monitors.
Table 5 shows the multivariate regression results, which are generated using twoday cumulative abnormal returns around the spin-offs announcement as the dependent
variable and firm-specific control variables and bank-relation variables as independent
variables. The regressions control for firm size, corporate focus, and profitability of the
firms prior to the spin-offs announcements. We measure firm size as the logarithm of the
total asset, and we measure profitability as return on assets. The focus-increasing dummy
variable is one if the industry of the parent company is different from that of the spun-off
firms. In model (1) of Table 5, we regress CARs against a keiretsu-affiliation dummy
variable and the above mentioned control variables. There is a significant 6.4% of
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difference in abnormal returns around announcement between keiretsu-affiliated and nonkeiretsu-affiliated firms at the 5% level. In model (2) of Table 5, bank loan ration
calculated as the bank loan normalized by the book value of total assets does not show
any significant relationship to the abnormal returns, but the interaction variable with the
bank-appointed director indicator variable is positively significant at the 10%. This
model indicates that the amount of bank debt may have monitoring impact through the
bank-appointed director. In model (3) of Table 5, we find that existence of a bankappointed director on the board results in the significantly higher CARs. This indicates
that bank-appointed directors seem to play significant monitoring roles in internal capital
markets. Model (4) of Table 5 indicates that the greatest impact on shareholder’s wealth
is when firms have a keiretsu-affiliation and a bank-appointed director on the board. This
is not surprising given the previous results in model (2) and (3). Unreported analysis
shows that bank ownership is not significantly related to the announcement abnormal
returns, but as it is shown in model (5) of Table 5, main bank ownership has a significant
positive relationship with the abnormal return at the 10% significance level. Therefore,
the results suggest that simultaneous bank ownerships of both debt and equity claims
seem to have significant effect on spin-offs abnormal returns. In contrast with findings of
Desai and Jain (1999), the focus-increasing dummy variable does not show any
significant relationship with shareholder wealth change. However, when the focusincreasing spin-offs which are associated with the existence of a bank-appointed director
or a keiretsu-affiliation, there is a significant positive relationship with announcement
abnormal returns, shown in models (7) and (8) of Table 5. In sum, the Japanese market
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positively responds to spin-offs and reacts even more strongly when firms are linked with
strong bank governance.

Post-Spin-Offs Market-Adjusted Long-Term Abnormal Returns

Table 6 shows the univariate analysis of average post-spin-offs market-adjusted
abnormal returns and its significance of t-test. After the spin-offs for 12 months, 24
months, and 36 months, there are significant positive abnormal returns of 1.35%, 1.12%,
and 0.94% respectively at the significance level of 1%. The results indicate that the
internal reorganization after spin-offs create value for shareholders in the long run. We
investigate whether the established relation between the shareholder wealth change
during the announcements and bank-related variables still exist after spin-offs.
Table 7 shows the multivariate regression results, which are based on 12-months
post-spin-offs market-adjusted abnormal returns as the dependent variable and firmspecific control variables and bank-relation variables as independent variables. In model
(1) of Table 7, keiretsu-affiliation does not show any significant difference in post-spinoffs market-adjusted abnormal returns, but the interaction variable with Tobin’s Q below
sample median indicator variable (Q-dummy) shows positive significant difference at the
10% level. In model (2) of Table 3, the result indicates that both bank loan amount and
the interaction variable between bank loan amount and Q-dummy variable are
significantly positively related to post-spin-offs market-adjusted abnormal returns at 10%
and 1% each. Models (3) and (4) report similar result as model (1), that is interaction
variables between main bank loan amount and Q-dummy variable and the interaction
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variable between bank-appointed director and Q-dummy variable are significantly
positively related to post-spin-offs market-adjusted abnormal returns at 10% and 1%.
Overall, there are significant positive relationships between the bank-related governance
variables and the abnormal returns after spin-offs for the Q-dummy variable. This is
consistent with Kang, Shivdasani, and Yamada (2000), who suggest that firms with poor
investment opportunities (measured by Q) have greater benefit from closer ties with
banks, who serve as informed creditors.

Herfindahl Index as a Measure of Corporate Focus

As shown in Panel A of Table 8, the difference between the Herfindahl index one
year after and one year before spin-offs is shown to be significantly positive at the 5%
significance level. Panel B of Table 8 shows that the change in the Herfindahl index is
significantly positively related to bank relationship variables. Model (1) in Panel B of
Table 8 indicates that keiretsu-affiliation dummy variable has a significant positive
relationship with the increase in the Herfindahl index at the 5% significance level. Model
(2) of the table shows that the interaction term between keiretsu-affiliation and bank loan
has a significant positive relationship with the Herfindahl index change at the 1%
significance level. It can be interpreted that the firms with the stronger relationship with
banks have the greater increase in the Herfindahl index. It is noteworthy that the
Herfindahl index change is not associated with the focus-increasing dummy variable
based on industries of parents and spin-offs, suggesting that these two alternative proxies
for corporate focus actually do not pick up the same aspect of corporate focus.
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Diversification Discount and Japanese Corporate Spin-offs

We find that the diversification discounts in the Japanese firms are significantly
reduced after the spin-offs. Furthermore, the degree of reduction in diversification
discount is positively related to the firms’ relationship with the bank. Panel A of Table 9
shows that the difference in the diversification discount between one year after and one
year before spin-offs is significantly positive (t=2.3). In Panel B of Table 9, the crosssectional regression results suggest that the degree of reductions in the diversification
discount has a significant positive relationship with bank relationship variables. Model
(1) of Panel B shows that the loan amount from banks that have the ownership of the firm
has a significant positive effect on the discount at the 1% significance level. Also, model
(2) of the table shows that the bank loan from the firm’s main bank with ownership has a
significant positive relationship at the 1% level. It can be interpreted that the firms with
the closer relationship with banks result in higher reductions in the diversification
discount. In models (3) and (4), the analysis includes the interaction variable between the
bank relationship and the Q-dummy variable. The results of models (3) and (4) indicate
that the monitoring role of banks in poorly performing firms is stronger in terms of
reducing the diversification discount through spin-offs. The results are also consistent
with the results of models (1) and (2), which indicate that a stronger bank relationship
creates a greater reduction of the diversification discount.
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Conclusion
We study the relationship between internal capital market and banks relationship
by examining the Japanese corporate spin-offs from 2001 through 2003 since the
establishment of new spin-offs law in Japan. The Japanese spin-off data provide a unique
environment in which we can focus on the effect of corporate restructurings on the
efficiency of internal capital markets, not confronted by the control issues. This study
shows that there are significant positive abnormal returns around the announcement;
significant positive market-adjusted returns after the spin-offs for 12, 24, and 36 months;
a significant increase in focus of firms in terms of the Herfindahl index; and a significant
reduction in the diversification discount.
Announcement abnormal returns are positively related to the keiretsu-affiliation
of firms, main bank ownership, and existence of a bank-appointed director. Neither bank
loan amount nor main bank loan amount are significantly related to the abnormal returns,
but bank loan amount with the existence of bank-appointed directors have a significant
positive relationship with the announcement abnormal returns. Moreover, if the firm is
keiretsu-affiliated and has directors appointed by banks, then the firm has significantly
higher announcement returns than those affiliated only with keiretsu or with bankappointed directors.
In contrast to previous studies, our study does not show significantly positive
abnormal returns for focus-increasing spin-offs when corporate focus is measured based
on industry differences. However, if the focus-increasing spin-offs are related to keiretsuaffiliations or the existence of a bank-appointed director, then there are significantly
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positive announcement abnormal returns. The market-adjusted 12-months excess returns
are significantly positively related to bank governance variables. In addition, we show
evidence that under-performing firms benefit more from closer ties with banks than those
who are not closely tied with banks. Also, the degree of increase in the Herfindahl index
is significantly positively related to bank relationship. Finally, the corporate spin-offs in
Japan seem to significantly reduce the diversification discount, and the degree of its
reduction is positively related to the bank relationship with firms.
Our empirical evidence suggests that there is a significant relationship between
internal capital market and banks in Japan; the closer relationship with banks creates
shareholder wealth, increases the focus of firms, and reduces diversification discounts
after the internal capital market reorganization through spin-offs.
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TABLES
Table 1 Annual Frequency of Japanese Spin-off and Keiretsu-Affiliations
This table lists the annual frequency of the Japanese spin-offs of listed firms in our sample, categorized by
the keiretsu-affiliation of the firms. The sample includes the finance, real estate, and utility companies,
which we excluded for our analysis. Keiretsu-affiliation information is retrieved from Industrial
Groupings in Japan 2001.

Year

Keiretsu Affiliated
Firms

Non-Keiretsu Affiliated

Total

2001

12

24

36

2002

29

44

73

2003

18

34

52

Total

59

102

161
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Table 2 Number of Japanese Spin-offs by Keiretsu-affiliation Indication, and Focusincreasing Indication Variables from 2001 through 2003
This table summarizes the number of the Japanese spin-offs announced from January 1, 2001 through
December 31, 2003 excluding the finance, utility, and real estate companies, categorized by keiretsuaffiliation and focus-increasing indicator variables. Keiretsu-affiliation information is retrieved from
Industrial Groupings in Japan 2001. Focus-increasing dummy variable is indicated as focus-increasing if
the industry of spun-off firms is different froms that of the parent company’s major industry. There are 40
industries which are categorized by MARR (Merger & Acquisition Resource Report)

Focus

Keiretsu-Affiliation

Increasing

NonIncreasing

Total

Affiliated

25

31

56

Non-Affiliated

44

51

95

Total

69

82

151

39

Table 3 Summary Statistics of Pre-spin-offs for Japanese Spin-offs
This table provides the summary statistics of Japanese spin-offs samples listed in the First and Second
section of Tokyo Stock Exchange, which are announced from January 1, 2001 through December 31st,
2003 and completed since effective date of the new corporate spin-offs law, April 1, 2001. The sample of
Japanese corporate spin-offs are obtained from MARR (Merger and Acquisition Research Report, Tokyo)
published by REOCFF CO., which is the largest M&A data service in Japan. Cumulative abnormal returns
are calculated from market model estimated from days -258 to -11 relative to the press announcement.

Standard
Variables

Mean

Median

Deviation

Total Assets (billions of yen)

669421

80175

1517245

Sales (billions of yen)

610139

88443

1369816

Bank Loan to Total Asset Ratio

.30133

.314865

.19968

Bank Ownership

19.7589

19.9

11.0011

Main Bank Ownership

6.17

5.60

4.182

Proportion of Firms in keiretsu-affiliation

38.8

-

-

Proportion of Firms has Bank-Appointed
Director

62.2

-

-

40

Table 4 Two-Day (-1,0) Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Japanese
Keiretsu-Affiliated Spin-offs, and Focus-Increasing Spin-offs
This table summarizes the market-adjusted two day cumulative abnormal returns of Japanese spin-offs
samples listed in the First and Second section of Tokyo Stock Exchange, which are announced the spin-offs
from January 1st, 2001 through December 31st, 2003 and completed the spin-offs since effective date of
new corporate spin-offs law in April of 2001. Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated from market
model estimated from days -258 to -11 relative to the press announcement. Mean cumulative abnormal
returns and the p-values are reported in the parentheses under the mean.

Focus-Increase

Non-

Total

Focus-Increase
.0801 ***

.019 **

.0468 ***

Keiretsu-Affiliated

(.000)

(.0128)

(.000)

Non-

-.0075

.0033

-.0015

Keiretsu-Affiliated

(.3174)

(.6744)

(.7794)

.0261 ***

.0094 *

.0171 **

(.000)

(.0782)

(.016)

Total

*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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Table 5 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Two-Day Cumulative Abnormal Returns for
Japanese Spin-offs
This table summarizes the regression analysis with market-adjusted two day cumulative abnormal returns
as dependent variables and bank-related governance variable as independent variable of Japanese spin-offs
samples we collected. Bank-centered industrial groups, keiretsu, are identified from Industrial Groupings
in Japan 2001 published by Dodwell Marketing Consultants. We retrieve main bank information, bank
ownership, and consolidated bank loan data from autumn versions of Japan Company Handbook between
2000 and 2003. Specific bank loan data and end of fiscal year financial data is collected from Nikkei
Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS), Japan Company Handbook, and Worldscope. These
financial data are based on consolidated financial statements, which evaluate the performance of the
business group as a whole, including spun-offs and related units. Bank-sent director variable is collected
from year 2000 version through 2003 version of Yakuinshikiho(Toyo Keizain Shimposha). Daily stock
price of firms, and daily Nikkei Average Index are retrieved from Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank
System (NEEDS). The numbers in parentheses are p-values for two-tailed test.
Independent Variables
Log of Total Asset
Focus Increasing Dummy
Return on Asset
Keiretsu Dummy

(1)
-.010
(.125)
.014
(.565)
-.147
(-.149)
.064**
(.025)

Bank Loan to Total Asset

(2)
.327
(.327)
.014
(.606)
-.134
(.227)

(3)
-.006
(.324)
.016
(.533)
-.179*
(.087)

(5)
.000
(.981)
-.004
(.821)
-.106*
(.079)

(6)
.001
(.877)
.000
(.990)
-.096*
(.097)

(7)
-.003
(.572)
-.024
(.476)
-.166
(.105)

(8)
-.007
(.272)
-.023
(.402)
-.156
(.121)

-.024
(.794)

Bank-Appointed Director

.051*
(.060)

Keiretsu Dummy × Bank
Sent Director Dummy
Main Bank Ownership

.101***
(.001)
.003*
(.068)

Bank Loan to Total Asset ×
Bank-Appointed Director
Dummy
Main Bank Ownership ×
Bank Sent Director Dummy
Focus Increasing Dummy ×
Bank-Appointed Director
Dummy
Focus Increasing Dummy ×
Keiretsu Dummy
Adjusted R2
Number of observations

(4)
-.011*
(.078)
.025
(.291)
-.111
(.266)

.135*
(.091)
.004***
(.006)
.070*
(.077)
.096**
(.013)
.043
N =134

.033
N = 122

.036
N = 122

.090
N = 134

.026
N = 113

.066
N = 120

.033
N = 129

*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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.052
N=134

Table 6 Post-spin-offs Market-Adjusted Excess Returns of Japanese Spin-offs
This table summarizes the post-spin-off performance of Japanese spin-offs. Post-spin-offs market-adjusted
excess returns for 3-, 6-, 12-, 24-, 36-months are calculated for Japanese spin-offs completed from 2001
through 2004. Market-adjusted excess returns are defined as average difference between firm’s monthly
compounded returns and monthly compounded monthly Nikkei index. Mean market-adjusted excess
returns and the p-value of t-tests are reported in the parentheses under the mean. The sample excludes
some recent events because our data set is limited up to September of 2004. P-values from t-tests are
reported in parentheses below the mean and p-values from sign-rank tests are reported in parentheses below
the median.

Post Spin-offs

Total

Keiretsu-affiliated

Non- keiretsuaffiliated

Focus-Increasing

Non-FocusIncreasing

3 months

6 months

12 months

24 months

36 months

.5586%

.7341%

1.3505%***

1.1124%***

0.9385%***

(0.495)

(0.118)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(.002)

-0.4880%

0.1120%

0.7960%***

0.9568%***

0.8603%***

(.2176)

(0.4662)

(0.000)

(0.000)

(0.0018)

N = 129

N=129

N=125

N=70

N=22

0.0024

0.0067

0.0144**

0.0095***

0.0071

(0.1095)

(0.3648)

(0.0155)

(0.0037)

(0.1794)

-0.0143**

-0.00132

0.0098***

0.0064***

0.0032

(0.0120)

(0.8255)

(0.0006)

(0.0009)

(0.2969)

N=49

N=49

N=49

N=26

N=7

0.00859

0.0088

0.0133***

0.0124***

0.0092**

(0.3436)

(0.1508)

(0.0049)

(0.0001)

(0.0125)

-0.00203

0.0026

0.0071***

0.0101

0.0104**

(0.9130)

(0.5764)

(0.0073)

(0.0001)***

(0.0151)

N=80

N=80

N=76

N=44

N=15

-0.0015

0.0115*

0.0167***

0.0141***

0.0126**

(0.8846)

(0.0760)

(0.0004)

(0.0001)

(0.0123)

-0.0100

0.0016

0.0109

0.0130***

0.0138**

(0.2783)

(0.2436)

(0.0001)***

(0.0001)

(0.0371)

N=56

N=56

N=54

N=31

N=10

0.0122

0.0054

0.0114**

0.0091***

0.0051

(0.3130)

(0.4235)

(0.0358)

(0.0021)

(0.1349)

-0.0023

0.0018

0.0057**

0.0064***

0.0048
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Existence of
Bank-Appointed
Director

Non-Existence of
Bank-Appointed
Director

(0.8554)

(0.7543)

(0.0240)

(0.0009)

(0.1294)

N=73

N=73

N=71

N=39

N=12

0.01383

0.0103

0.0151***

0.0083***

0.0016

(0.2884)

(0.1392)

(0.0059)

(0.0037)

(0.6418)

-0.0024

0.0018

0.0085***

0.0054***

-0.0009

(0.9978)

(0.4601)

(0.0024)

(0.0026)

(0.9219)

N=73

N=73

N=71

N=38

N=10

-0.0081

0.0036

0.0136**

0.0153***

0.0154***

(0.3821)

(0.6233)

(0.0348)

(0.0001)

(0.0003)

-0.0049

-0.0017

0.0095***

0.0130***

0.0145***

(0.2203)

(0.8460)

(0.0012)

(0.0001)

(0.0005)

N=45

N=45

N=43

N=28

N=13

*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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Table 7 Cross-Sectional Analysis of 12-months Market-Adjusted Post-spin-offs
Returns for Japanese Spin-offs
Post-spin-offs market-adjusted excess returns for12-months are calculated for Japanese spin-offs completed
from 2001 through 2004. Market-adjusted excess returns are defined as average difference between firm’s
monthly compounded returns and monthly compounded monthly Nikkei index. Mean market-adjusted
excess returns and the p-values are reported in the parentheses under the mean. The sample excludes some
recent events, because our data set is limited up to September of 2004. Tobin’s Q dummy variable
indicates whether the firm’s Tobin’s Q is below sample median.

Independent Variables
Log of Total Asset

(1)
-.004*
(.074)
.004
(.555)
.009
(.769)
.001
(.949)
.022*
(.060)

Focus-Increasing Dummy
Return on Asset
Keiretsu Dummy
Keiretsu Dummy × Tobin Q Dummy

Bank Loan Ratio

(2)
-.004**
(.029)
.002
(.726)
.023
(.441)

(3)
-.001
(.461)
-.007
(.456)
-.013
(.679)

.034*
(.098)
.057***
(.004)

Bank Loan to Total Asset × Tobin Q
Dummy
Main Bank Loan Ratio

.000
(.947)
.139*
(.059)

Main Bank Loan to Total Asset ×
Tobin Q Dummy
Bank-Sent Director Dummy

.027

.118

.011

-.010
(.235)
.039***
(.000)
.127

N=125

N =125

N =81

N =114

Bank-Sent Director Dummy ×
Tobin Q Dummy
Adjusted R2
Number of observations

(4)
-.001
(.764)
.004
(.613)
.009
(.752)

*,**,and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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Table 8 Univariate and Cross-Sectional Analysis of Herfindahl Index Changes from
Pre- to Post-spin-offs in Japan
Herfindahl index measures degree of firm’s focus. Herfindahl index is calculated as the sum of squares of
each segment’s sales as a proportion of total sales. P-values from sign-rank tests are reported in parentheses
below the median and p-values from t-tests are reported in parentheses below the mean.

Panel A. T-test
N

Min.

Max.

Median

Mean

98

-.2663

.6469

.0046**

.02029**

(0.0356)

(0.044)

*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
Panel B. Cross-Sectional Analysis
Independent Variables
Log of Total Asset
Focus-Increasing Dummy
Return on Asset
Keiretsu Dummy

(1)
-.011*
(.067)
.020
(.338)
.057
(.513)
.049*
(.053)

Bank Loan to Total Asset

(2)
-.011**
(..049)
.021
(.302)
.087
(.329)

Adjusted R2

.014

-.045
(.473)
.168***
(.006)
.075

Number of observations

N=93

N =93

Keiretsu Dummy × Bank Loan to Total Asset

*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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Table 9 Univariate and Cross-Sectional Analysis of Diversification Discount
Changes from Pre- to Post-spin-offs in Japan
Diversification discount calculation follows Lins and Servaes (1999), which is similar to that of Berger and
Ofek (1995). Bank loan with ownership is the amount of bank debt obtained from banks which have the
ownership of the firm. Similarly, main bank loan with ownership is the amount of bank debt obtained from
main banks which have the ownership of the firm. P-values from sign-rank tests are reported in parentheses
below the median and p-values from t-tests are reported in parentheses below the mean.

Panel A. T-test
N

Min.

Max.

Median

Mean

54

-1.10

8.85

.2114***

.6509**

(0.0026)

(0.025)

Panel B. Cross-Sectional Analysis
Independent Variables
Log of Total Asset
Focus-Increasing Dummy
Return on Asset
Bank Loan with Ownership to
Total Asset
Main Bank Loan with Ownership
to Total Asset

(1)
.121
(.214)
-.163
(.653)
-.570
(.575)
9.624***
(.000)

(2)
.151
(.137)
-.455
(.202)
-.539
(.570)

(3)
.131
(.425)
-.584
(.361)
2.454
(.233)

(4)
.116
(.503)
-.828
(.220)
2.653
(.197)

3.557***
(.009)

3.826***
(.006)

12.827***
(.000)

Tobin Q
Bank Loan with Ownership to
Total Asset × Tobin Q Below
Sample Median Dummy
Main Bank Loan with Ownership
to Total Asset × Tobin Q Below
Sample Median Dummy
Adjusted R2

.315

.527

Number of observations

N=43

N =39

10.043***
(.006)
13.6***
(.001)
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.217
N = 51

N =47

STUDY TWO
INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS, INVESTMENT, AND BANK
RELATIONSHIP
- EVIDENCE FROM JAPANESE CORPORATE SPIN-OFFS

In conjunction with the internal capital market literature, studies on spin-offs
analyze how firms increase the efficiency of internal capital markets after spin-off
transactions. Spin-offs allow us to examine changes in the efficiency of internal capital
markets because firms’ capital is reallocated through spin-offs. Unlike other divestitures
such as equity carve-outs or asset sales, spin-offs do not generate cash for the parent and
the spun-off company. Because of the non-cash-generating features, spin-offs provide a
well-furnished natural experimental setting for internal capital market analysis.
Literature on internal capital markets (e.g., Gertner et al., 2002; Dittmar and Shivdasani,
2003; Ahn and Denis, 2004) shows that spin-offs improve the investment efficiency.13
Most recently, Choi and Han (2005) show that internal capital markets in Japan become
more efficient after spin-offs.14
In this study, we examine the investment efficiency changes in Japanese
companies after corporate spin-offs. In addition, we investigate whether banks monitor
the spin-offs’ transactions during the restructuring to increase the efficiency of internal
capital markets. Our main contributions are three-fold. The first is due to the uniqueness

13

Gertner et al. (2002) show an increase in investment sensitivity after spin-offs using spun-off division
data. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) examine the effect of divestitures in investment of parent firms, and
Ahn and Denis (2004) study the changes of investment policy for the combined firm of parent and spun-off
companies.
14
Specifically, they show significant positive abnormal returns around the announcements, excess returns
after the spin-offs, increases of Herfindahl index, and reduction in the diversification discount after the
spin-offs. Also, these variables are significantly positively related to bank-related governance variables
such as keiretsu-affiliation, bank loan amount, main bank ownership, and existence of bank-appointed
director variables.

of the Japanese spin-off structure in which a division becomes a new subsidiary but still
remains under the control of the parent company. Thus, its overall governance structure
does not change. This has an important implication for the study of internal capital
markets because these restructurings are purely internally executed transactions, which
are different from what is commonly thought of as a spin-off. Thus, we can examine the
effect of corporate restructurings on the efficiency of internal capital markets without
changing the ownership and control structure. Our empirical setting complements that of
Ahn and Denis (2004),15 which combines the investment efficiency of the parent and the
spin-off companies. This study confirms the findings of previous internal capital markets
literature, which find that internal restructuring through spin-offs increases the efficiency
of internal capital markets.
Second, this investigation extends the studies on Japanese deregulation that has
been implemented in the last two decades. The new corporate spin-off law is the endresult of recent Japanese capital market deregulation and Commercial Code revisions in
the late 1990s and the early 2000s. These laws initiated the simplified spin-off
procedures, using simplified merger procedures and stock transfer systems.16
The data of this study covers the deregulation time period of the year 2001
through the year 2003, which has not been examined yet in the literature. Anderson and
Makhija (1999), Wu and Xu (2005), and Kato et al. (2006) have also investigated the
effect of financial deregulation in Japan using data from the 1980s, 1974-1997, and 1997-

15

Ahn and Denis’ (2004) empirical setting complements that of Gertner et al. (2002) and Dittmar and
Shivdasani (2003), because they use the combined data of parent and spin-offs.
16
These procedures will be elaborated on in Section 3.
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2001 respectively. Our study investigates one of the deregulatory issues in the “Big
Bang,” which started in 1998 and finished in the spring of 2001.
Third, this study complements the Japanese banking literature.17 It is well known
that the Japanese corporate structure is governed by a bank-centered relationship. Thus,
the Japanese spin-offs dataset provides a unique setting that can test the impact of the
bank relationship on internal capital markets. Diamond (1984, 1991), among others,
argues that banks monitor their client firms and the delegated monitoring reduces the
information asymmetry between the firms and the capital markets. Our study provides
evidence of the monitoring role of Japanese banks in the investment behavior of internal
capital markets, and shows results consistent with Kang, Shivdasani, and Yamada (2000),
among others.
We find that investment sensitivity in Japanese companies increases significantly
after internal restructurings through spin-offs, consistent with Gertner et al. (2002).
Unlike other studies (Gertner et al., 2002; Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003), we show that
the related spin-offs show a significant increase of investment sensitivity after being
spun-off. Furthermore, we find that banks’ monitoring function seems to increase
investment efficiency. Examining the bank-related governance structure in Japan,
including keiretsu-affiliation, main bank ownership, and amount of bank loan, we show
that bank-related spin-offs’ investments are more sensitive to investment opportunities,
Tobin’s Q. We find that keiretsu-affiliated firms’ spin-offs increase investment
sensitivity after being spun-off. Also, spin-offs with low Qs and high bank loans

17

See Choi and Han (2005) for details on Japanese banking literature.
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experience a significant increase in investment sensitivity, probably because of greater
incentives for banks to monitor them, as argued by Kang et al. (2000). This result is also
consistent with Khanna and Palepu’s findings (2000) that the internal capital market for
Indian business-group-affiliated firms is more efficient compared to that of non-affiliated
firms. Hoshi et al. (1990, 1991) suggest that keiretsu-affiliated firms are not as liquidity
constrained as non-affiliated firms and hence can be more efficient in investment policy.
Thus, we suggest that banks play such a role in internal capital markets to ensure efficient
investment decisions of the firms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide the
background on the Japanese financial deregulations and spin-offs. In Section 3, we
discuss the hypotheses and methodology. In Section 4, we describe the data and
descriptive statistics of Japanese corporate spin-offs and discuss the empirical results.
Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.

Japanese Financial Deregulation and Internal Capital Markets Restructuring
The Japanese economy and financial markets have been stumbling for the last
decade after the collapse of the bubble economy in the late 1980s. Since then, to
reinvigorate the economy, the Japanese government has tried a wide range of
deregulations through numerous revisions of the Commercial Codes. This section
summarizes the process of recent financial deregulation in Japan, focusing on the
Commercial Codes revisions. Then we anchor our study on Japanese corporate spin-offs
as the extension of Japanese deregulation literature.
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In Japan, the most important factor directly influencing the financial system and
corporate governance is the existing Commercial Codes revised by governmental,
academic, and corporate entities. In 1950, the Commercial Codes were revised
dramatically to separate ownership and management. After the revisions in the 1950, the
Commercial Codes were revised every several years.
Among the recent Japanese financial deregulations through Commercial Codes
revisions, in the mid-1980s, the standards for bond issuance were liberalized through
deregulation acceleration. As a result of this deregulation, many Japanese firms could
decrease their heavy dependence on bank financing and select debt capital. Anderson
and Makhija’s (1999) study of Japanese firms in the late 1980s, which investigated the
choice of monitored bank financing and arm’s-length public bond, suggests that
monitored bank financing provides benefits to firms compared to the public debt with
high agency costs. Along with this study, Wu and Xu (2005) studied a sample of
Japanese firms during 1974-1997, finding adverse keiretsu-effects in the 1980s, while the
adverse value effect diminished in the 1990s, when heavy burdens of capital market
regulation on the public debt market were removed: “This evidence presages the waning
of traditional keiretsu practices, along with the main-bank-centered governance and
finance structure” (Wu and Xu 2005).
The deregulation did not stop even when the Japanese economy was in the most
serious recession after the Asian financial crisis in 1998-99. The “Big Bang”
deregulation of the Japanese financial market started in 1998 through Commercial Codes
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amendments. The amendments enhanced flexibility in the financial markets:18 stock
options provisions, mergers, and internal capital market reorganizations. The stock
options provisions amendments allowed the issuance of stock options for employees,
including executives. Kato et al. (2006) study the shareholder wealth effect of 350 firms
that adopted option-based compensation plans between 1997 and 2001, and they find that
good incentive-based compensation plans create shareholder value. In 1997, merger
procedures were simplified, and the Revision of the Anti-monopoly Law allowed
establishment of pure holding companies, banned since 1947. In 1999, in conjunction
with the simplified merger procedures and Anti-monopoly Law, the stock swap system
and stock transfer system were created to facilitate the transactions between whollyowned subsidiaries and their parent companies. The 2000 Amendment of the
Commercial Codes introduced the procedures for company split-up to make restructuring
through spin-offs or divestitures easier.
We extend the studies on the relationship between Japanese corporate governance
and Japanese deregulations using the Japanese spin-offs data between 2001 and 2003.
On April 1, 2001, the new spin-off laws went into effect, and many Japanese firms
became involved in spin-offs for their corporate restructurings. The new spin-off laws
are the end-result of the Commercial Code revisions of the Japanese capital market in the
late 1990s and the early 2000s. Thus, the various revisions relating to stock repurchases,

18

Milaupt (2003) divides the amendments into two groups. One group might be called flexibility
enhancing amendments. These Code changes expand corporate finance options and increase organizational
flexibility for Japanese firms in the areas of stock options, mergers, and corporate reorganizations. A
second group might be called monitoring enhancing amendments. These Code amendments include
changes to the shareholder derivative suit mechanism and statutory auditor system as well as reforms to the
corporate board structure.
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holding companies, and simplified mergers and spin-offs have not only brought the legal
framework more in tune with the demands of Japan’s internationalized capital markets,
but have also made the management of Japanese corporations more conscious of
corporate value.19 Thus, this study investigates the effect of Japanese financial
deregulation after the year 2001 using corporate spin-offs data that has not been
examined yet.
Around the time of the Asian financial crisis at the end of the 1990s, the Japanese
government and corporations started to realize the need for corporate reorganizations,
such as spin-offs or other divestitures, to improve the flexibility and efficiency of their
corporate structures in the competitive international capital market. The institutional
legal frame of Japanese corporate spin-offs began to change in 1997, and many of the
Japanese multi-divisional firms reorganized their internal capital markets by transforming
divisions into independent units such as wholly-owned subsidiaries or spin-offs to obtain
optimal internal capital market structures. Before the enactment of the new corporate
spin-off laws in April 2001, Japanese firms were required to be inspected by the federal
court before conducting spin-offs. They also needed to obtain individual approval from
creditors for the transfer of liabilities and assets, which impeded flexible corporate
restructuring. However, the procedure has been simplified since the new Commercial
Codes revision in 2001. In the past, cash transactions were required, but the new law
allowed easier transactions without cash, accompanied by the stock swap and stock
transfer systems changes in 1999. Consequently, it became easier for firms to choose

19

Japan Investor Relations and Investor Support, Inc. Research Newsletter, Issue No.1, December 2001
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their optimal corporate structure, setting the stage for implementing the new corporate
spin-off laws in Japan.

Hypotheses and Methodology
Hypotheses: Investment and Bank Relationship

Gertner, Power, and Scharfstein (2002) show that spin-offs improve the efficiency
of capital allocation through spin-offs; these results are found primarily in the industries
where the parent and spin-off firms are unrelated and in spin-offs where announcement
returns are higher. Desai and Jain (1999) find that both the announcement period and
long-run abnormal returns for the focus-increasing spin-offs are significantly larger than
those for non-focus-increasing spin-offs. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) show that
divestiture reduces the diversification discount and increases the efficiency of segment
investment, suggesting that inefficient investment is partly responsible for the
diversification discount and supporting the corporate focus and financing hypothesis.
Furthermore, we estimate equation (1) by dividing the sample into sub-samples
based on the characteristics of the spin-offs: related and unrelated, and regular and
merger-facilitated spin-offs. The related spin-offs create an independent, related business
unit within the conglomerate. Berger and Ofek (1995) argue that diversified firms with
unrelated businesses are less efficient. Therefore, we expect that related spin-offs
significantly increase investment sensitivity after being spun off. On the other hand,
unrelated spin-offs diversify the conglomerate by creating independent, unrelated
businesses. However, even if unrelated spin-offs diversify the conglomerate, division
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managers become more independent from the parent company and have greater
incentives to increase investment efficiency. Therefore, unrelated spin-offs’ net effect of
diversification is not clear in the efficiency of the overall conglomerate.
There are three major bank-oriented Japanese corporate governance systems: 1) a
bank-centered group called keiretsu, 2) bank ownership of firms, and 3) main bank.
Keiretsu 20 is a bank-centered, long-term transactional relationship that closely monitors
client firms; keiretsu, the bank-centered group, is linked by “stable inter-corporate
shareholding”21 between firms (Morck and Nakamura, 1999). Thus, bank-related
Japanese corporate governance enhances the unique equity ownership structure, which is
cross shareholdings between industrial firms and banks.22 Hoshi et al. (1990) find that
the insurance and monitoring roles are more evident with keiretsu-affiliated firms.
Therefore, we expect that investment sensitivity under keiretsu-affiliation would be
greater than under non-keiretsu affiliation.
Equity ownership of industrial firms by Japanese banks is unique to the Japanese
governance system, while equity ownership by banks is limited in the United States.
Morck et al. (2000) study the relationship between main bank ownership and firm value
in Japan, arguing that bank ownership increases firm value only when the banks and
shareholders are closely aligned in incentives. In particular, they examine main banks’
dual ownership of debt and equity claims; this dual ownership measures the degree of

20

There are eight horizontal industrial groups in Japan: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Sanwa, Dai-Ichi
Kangyo Bank, Fuyo, Tokai, and Industrial Bank of Japan.
21
Morck and Nakamura (1999) define ‘stable shareholders’ as those who almost never sell out and
consistently support management.
22
Morck, Nakamura, and Shivdasani (2000) explain the origins of Japanese bank ownership in detail.
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alignment of interests between debt and equity holders. The main banks are typically the
major lenders to firms, and play the role of information controller and monitor of the firm,
intervening in financing and investment decisions. Hoshi et al. (1990) find that firms
with a close relation with main banks are less liquidity constrained. Also, main banks
organize rescue programs when their client firms become financially distressed, and this
insurance role leads them to monitor the firm more closely. Kang and Shivdasani (1995)
find that poorly performing firms are more likely associated with higher CEO turnovers
when firms have a close relationship with main banks.
Morck et al. (2000) find that there is a non-linear relationship between main bank
ownership and firm value, showing that at low levels of ownership by main banks, firm
value decreases as ownership increases, and the opposite is shown sometimes at higher
levels. Banks as creditors may act against maximizing shareholder wealth; low-tomoderate ownership may empower banks to expropriate shareholder wealth. However,
with high levels of bank ownership, the adverse incentive is mitigated and the positive
effect of monitoring kicks in. Thus, we expect that investment efficiency increases at a
high level of main bank ownership.
Finally, Kang et al. (2000) show that there is a significant positive relationship
between the announcement returns of Japanese mergers and the loan amount from bank
and main bank. They suggest that Japanese banks, as debt holders, perform an important
monitoring function. We examine whether the bank loan amount affects our investment
model. We do not have main bank loan amounts due to the lack of the bank-specific loan
amount of each sample. Thus, we use the overall bank loan amount as a proxy for banks’
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monitoring incentives. Thus, we hypothesize that banks’ monitoring function affects the
increase in investment efficiency of internal capital markets.

Methodology

Our empirical model is similar to that of Gertner et al.’s (2002). Scaled capital
expenditures are regressed on Q in our investment model. Our estimation is based on the
panel framework of years -2, -1, +1, and +2 before and after spin-offs transactions. We
exclude the spin-offs’ year, because it overlaps the periods of pre- and post-spin-offs.
The basic empirical model is as follows:
IKit = αi + β1*Qit + β2*Qit*AFTER + β2*AFTER + ∑tγt*YEARt + εit.

(1)

In equation (1), IKit is the ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of total assets for
firm i at time t. AFTER is a dummy variable indicating the post-spin-off time period of
+1 and +2 as one and zero otherwise. Qit is a proxy of investment opportunities for firm i
at time t. YEARt is a calendar dummy variable of fiscal year t, which controls for the
specific year effect. Qit*AFTER is the interaction term to check if there is any significant
increase in investment sensitivity after spin-offs transactions. Our main focus is on the
coefficient estimate of the interaction term. In general, we expect a significant positive
β2—the coefficient of the interaction term between Tobin’s Q and the AFTER dummy
variable in equation (1)—if the investment efficiency of internal capital markets increases
through spin-offs. As discussed in Section 1, it is worthwhile to note that unlike other
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studies,23 our data make it convenient to compare pre- and post-spin-off events to
examine the overall effect of the spin-offs because the consolidated financial data is
available before and after spin-offs. In the following, we examine the estimation results
of the above investment model under various specifications based on bank governance
and spin-off-specific variables.
In estimation, we choose to employ the random effect model instead of the fixed
effect one. Zhou (2001) argues that the fixed effect model cannot detect an effect of
ownership on performance, considering a firm as a time variant entity allowing withinvariation rather than an invariant one. Therefore, we also use the random effect model
because firm-specific effects such as governance or board structures are not fixed but are
dynamic over time, especially during our estimation period.24 In Japan, during the
sample period of this study, many deregulations were in active progress. For example,
the Commercial Code amendment of 2002 exercised board reforms which allowed a
U.S.-style committee system for corporate governance. Therefore, based on Zhou’s
(2001) argument and actual Japanese regulation-specific effects on Japanese firm
dynamics, it is reasonable to use the random effect model for our analysis.

23

Gertner et al. (2002), Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003), and Ahn and Denis (2004).
We checked the Hausman test and results are mixed by different model estimation. Thus, we chose the
random effect model based on Zhou’s (2001) argument.

24
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Data and Empirical Analysis
Data and Sample Selection

We collected the sample of Japanese corporate spin-offs announced from January
1, 2001 through December 31, 2003 and completed since the effective date of the new
corporate spin-offs law in April 2001. The data source is Merger and Acquisition
Research Report (MARR, Tokyo) published by RECOFF CO., which is the largest M&A
data service provider in Japan. MARR lists the announcement dates of spin-offs, names
of parent and spun-off companies, and major industries of parent and spun-off companies.
In addition, we searched for spin-off news in four major Japanese financial papers: Nihon
Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Economic Journal), Nihon Keizai Sangyo Shimbun (Nikkei
Industrial Journal), Nihon Keizai Ryutuu Shimbun (Nikkei Distribution Journal), and
Nihon Keizai Kinyuu Shimbun (Nikkei Finance Journal). Bank-centered industrial groups,
keiretsu, are identified from Industrial Groupings in Japan 2001, published by Dodwell
Marketing Consultants.25 We restricted the sample to the firms listed in the First or the
Second Section of Tokyo Stock Exchange prior to the spin-off event year.26 We retrieved
main bank information, bank ownership data, and consolidated bank loan amount data
from the autumn issue of Japan Company Handbook between 2000 and 2003. Specific
bank-loan data and end-of-fiscal-year financial information were collected from Nikkei
Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS), Japan Company Handbook, and

25

Hoshi et al. (1990, 1991) use this for identifying the keiretsu-affiliated firms.
Japan Company Handbook contains the First and Second Section of Tokyo Stock Exchange listed firms’
firm specific information and financial data including the name of main bank, bank ownership, and bank
loan amount data.
26
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Worldscope. These financial data are based on consolidated financial statements, which
evaluate the performance of the business group as a whole, including spun-off companies
and related units. Daily stock prices and daily Nikkei Average Index were retrieved from
NEEDS.
Initial spin-off data consist of observations announced between 2001 and 2003,
totaling 293 spin-offs, including regular spin-offs (161) and merger-facilitated (132) spinoffs. Regular spin-offs are the transactions in which one of the divisions of the firm is
separated from the parent firm and becomes a wholly-owned subsidiary of the parent firm.
Merger-facilitated spin-offs are the transactions in which the separated division is merged
into one of the existing subsidiaries within the firm. Therefore, these two transactions are
pure internal transactions without any change of governance or ownership structure of the
firm. The sample excludes 19 companies: 8 real estate, 7 finance, and 4 utility companies.
In addition, 30 of the remaining samples are eliminated because the firms spun off more
than one division. Thus, the final sample includes 244 spin-off events. Table 10
describes the annual frequency of Japanese corporate spin-offs by different types. The
annual frequency of spin-offs increased significantly from 72 in the first year (2001) to
120 in 2002 and 101 in 2003. Panel A of Table 11 shows the summary statistics of firm
characteristics and bank governance variables. Main banks own approximately 6% of the
equity of the sample firms on average. Almost 40% of the sample firms are affiliated
with keiretsu. Finally, about 57% of the sample firms have bank-appointed directors.
Panel B of Table 11 summarizes the capital expenditures to total asset ratio and Tobin’s
Q of the firms before and after the spin-offs. The summaries of the capital expenditures
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and Q variables are categorized by keiretsu-affiliation of the firms. There is no
significant difference in capital expenditures between the keiretsu-affiliated and nonkeiretsu-affiliated firms across the panel time frame of the analysis. There is a significant
difference in Tobin’s Q between the keiretsu-affiliated and non-keiretsu-affiliated firms
before and after the spin-offs. The significant difference of Q decreases after spin-offs,
and the difference is not significant at year +2.

Empirical Results

Our study finds two main empirical results. First, in Japan, the efficiency of
internal capital markets increases through corporate spin-offs: investment becomes more
sensitive to investment opportunities. Second, banks’ monitoring roles seem to have a
significant positive impact on the investment sensitivity of internal capital markets
through spin-offs. Model (1) of Table 12 reports the estimation results of equation (1) for
the full sample. The estimate for the interaction term between the Q and AFTER dummy
variable is positive at the 10% level; the firms’ sensitivity of investment to Tobin’s Q
increases significantly after spin-offs. This result is consistent with Gertner et al.’s
(2002) contention that spin-offs may improve the allocation of capital.
Model (2) of Table 12 reports the estimation results of equation (1), dividing the
sample into two sub-samples based on whether the spin-off transaction is related or not.
A spin-off is defined as related when the spun-off firm’s industry is related to the parent’s.
Related spin-offs show a statistically significant increase in investment sensitivity
(significant at the 5% level) after the internal reorganization, while unrelated transactions
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do not. However, it is not clear if the efficiency increase results from a conglomerate’s
focus on its core business, because of the unique nature of Japanese spin-offs. For
example, in unrelated Japanese spin-offs, the spun-off unit still remains within the
conglomerate. This may confound the true meaning of corporate focus defined by
relatedness. Therefore, we use alternative measures of corporate focus, for example, the
Herfindahl index. The Herfindahl index measures the focus of a conglomerate based on
the size of each segment within the conglomerate. The mere number of segments does
not change after the spin-offs because spun-off firms remain in the conglomerate in
Japanese spin-offs. However, the size (e.g., sales) of a particular segment can increase
due to improved efficiency after becoming independent from parent firms, which may
affect the Herfindahl index. Thus, we divide the sample whether the Herfindahl index is
increased or not to measure focus changes. Model (3) of Table 12 reports that focusincreasing spin-offs show increase in investment sensitivity after spin-offs at the 10%
significance level. This result is consistent with Gertner et al.’s (2002) finding that focusincreasing spin-offs increase the investment efficiency of internal capital markets while
non-focus-increasing spin-offs do not.
To examine how bank monitoring influences the investment sensitivity result
above, we estimate the investment models using several sub-samples constructed based
on various bank-related variables: keiretsu-affiliation, bank loan amount normalized by
total assets, and main bank ownership. Hoshi et al. (1990) argue that keiretsu-affiliated
firms are less liquidity constrained even when they are financially distressed, and this
propping-up role may lead to monitoring the affiliated firms more closely. Model (1) of
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Table 13 reports that keiretsu-affiliated firms’ spin-offs show a significant increase in
investment sensitivity, at the 5% significance level, after the transaction. This supports
the finding that the bank-centered group, keiretsu, may play a significant monitoring role
in internal capital markets.
Model (2) of Table 13 does not show any significant increase in investment
sensitivity after spin-offs for either a high or low bank loan amount. We will elaborate on
this result later relating to poorly performing firms (low Q) in Panel B of Table 14.
However, when we investigate the sample with low and high main bank ownership, we
find, as shown in Model (3) of Table 13, that there is an increase in investment sensitivity
for the high main bank ownership sub-sample at the 10% significance level. This is
consistent with Morck et al. (2000), showing that the lesser conflict between debt and
equity holders with higher ownership affects investment policies by undertaking more
good projects. This result implies that the main bank ownership may facilitate monitoring
incentives in increasing investment sensitivity through spin-offs.
Finally, Panel A of Table 14 further separates the spin-off-specific sub-samples of
Models (2) and (3) of Table 3, based on bank-related and spin-off-specific variables,
keiretsu-affiliation, and relatedness. Among the four combinations of relatedness and
keiretsu-affiliation, only keiretsu-affiliated and related spin-offs show a significant
increase in investment sensitivity as shown in Model (1) in Panel A of Table 14. This
result is consistent with our bank-monitoring hypothesis that banks’ monitoring facilitates
the investment efficiency of internal capital markets after spin-offs. As mentioned,
relatedness in Japanese spin-offs is not appropriate for a proxy for corporate focus,
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requiring some alternative measure such as the Herfindahl index. From the results of
Model (2) in Panel A of Table 14, unrelated spin-offs, even if keiretsu-affiliated, do not
show any significant increase in investment sensitivity. As shown in Model (3) of Panel
A in Table 14, a significant increase of investment sensitivity of merger-facilitated spinoffs is shown by keiretsu-affiliated spin-offs. Thus, the bank-centered industrial groups,
keiretsu, seem to play a significant monitoring role in investment policy in Japanese
corporate spin-offs.
Kang et al. (2000) show that banks have greater monitoring incentives for firms
with poor investment opportunities (low Q), and that the announcement abnormal returns
of Japanese mergers are positively related to the interaction term between main bank loan
amount and the low Q dummy variable. They argue that poorly performing firms are
more likely to be bank-monitored. Panel B of Table 14 shows the estimated model with
the sub-samples with high- and low-Q spin-offs under high and low bank loan amounts.
Among the four combinations, only the high bank loan and low-Q sub-sample shows the
positively significant coefficient of interaction term, β2, of equation (1), consistent with
Kang et al.’s (2000) finding. Therefore, we conclude that these results are consistent with
our bank-monitoring hypothesis in Japanese internal capital markets.

Conclusion and Future Studies
Our study is based on the basic Q-theory which predicts that firms should invest
more if there are better investment opportunities. The Q variable is used as a proxy for
investment opportunities and capital expenditures as investments. Based on the basic
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empirical framework of Q-theory, we study the investment policy changes in internal
capital markets and the impact of banks’ monitoring in internal capital markets using
Japanese corporate spin-offs.
We analyze the Japanese corporate spin-offs announced from 2001 through 2003
since the establishment of the new spin-offs law. The Japanese spin-off data provides a
unique empirical environment where we can focus on the effect of corporate
restructurings on the efficiency of internal capital market, not confronted by the control
issues. We extend the studies on the relationship between Japanese corporate governance
and Japanese deregulations using Japanese spin-offs. Spin-offs are the end-result of
Commercial Codes revisions of the Japanese capital market in the late 1990s and the
early 2000s, which include revisions of stock repurchases, holding companies, and
simplified mergers procedures.
We find that the efficiency of internal capital markets in Japan increases through
corporate spin-offs; efficiency of investment policy within the firm has increased. Also,
we find that related spin-offs increase investment efficiency after being spun-off.
However, we explore this issue more with a more appropriate measure of corporate focus,
such as the Herfindahl index and find that focus-increasing spin-off companies increase
investment sensitivity consistent with Gertner et al. (2002). Furthermore, we find that
bank-centered spin-offs in Japan experience a significant increase in investment
sensitivity after being spun off. In addition, there is a significant increase in investment
sensitivity for the spin-offs with low Q and high bank loans. This is consistent with the
argument that Japanese banks have a greater incentive to monitor the firms with low
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investment opportunities (low Q), thus resulting in the improvement in investment
efficiency after being spun-off.
However, several future studies on empirical specifications emerged from the
results of this study. First, investment sensitivity analysis between capital expenditures
and Tobin’s Q could be controlled by size variables such as natural logarithm of sales or
total assets. In addition to bank related variables, the size effect could contribute to the
investment sensitivity. Second, in addition to the bank and size variables, we could
control the profitability or leverage of the firms. The profitability or leverage variable
such as operating income or debt to equity ratio could affect the investment sensitivity.
Finally, cash flows could be used as the proxy for the investment opportunities instead of
the capital expenditures. Therefore, the robustness checks by controlling the size,
profitability, or leverage and using cash flows for investment opportunities of the firms in
empirical analysis may strengthen our arguments.
In sum, our empirical evidence suggests that the efficiency of internal capital
markets in Japan increases through spin-offs. Also, banks’ monitoring roles seem to have
significant positive impacts on investment sensitivity through spin-offs.
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TABLES
Table 10 Annual Frequency of Spin-offs and MA Spin-offs per Year
This table lists the annual frequency of the Japanese spin-offs of listed firms in our sample, categorized by
the merger-facilitated spin-offs. The sample includes the finance, real estate, and utility companies, which
we excluded for our analysis. The sample of Japanese corporate spin-offs are obtained from MARR
(Merger and Acquisition Research Report, Tokyo) published by REOCFF CO., which is the largest M&A
data service in Japan and four major Japanese financial papers: Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Nikkei Economic
Journal), Nihon Keizai Sangyo Shimbun (Nikkei Industrial Journal), Nihon Keizai Ryutuu Shimbun (Nikkei
Distribution Journal), and Nihon Keizai Kinyuu Shimbun (Nikkei Finance Journal).

Year
2001
2002
2003
Total

Spin-Offs
36
73
52
161

MA Spin-Offs
36
47
49
132

71

Total
72
120
101
293

Table 11 Summary Statistics before Spin-offs and Capital Expenditures and Tobin’s Q before and after Spin-offs
This table provides the summary statistics of Japanese spin-offs samples listed in the First and Second section of Tokyo Stock Exchange, which are announced
from January 1, 2001 through December 31st, 2003 and completed since effective date of the new corporate spin-offs law, April 1, 2001. Financial data is
retrieved from NEEDS (Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System). Keiretsu-affiliation information is retrieved from Industrial Groupings in Japan 2001
published by Dodwell Marketing Consultants. Main bank information, bank ownership, and consolidated bank loan data is collected from autumn versions of
Japan Company Handbook between 2000 and 2003. The estimation of Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt
divided by book value of total assets.

Panel A. Summary Statistics before Spin-offs
Variables
Total Assets (billions of yen)
Sales (billions of yen)
Capital Expenditures to Total Asset Ratio
Tobin’s Q
Bank Loan to Total Asset Ratio
Bank Ownership
Main Bank Ownership
Proportion of Firms in keiretsu-affiliation
Proportion of Firms has Bank-Sent Director

Mean
918327
923831
0.0426
1.077
0.3063
0.2061
0.0590
0.4029
0.5708

Median
150916
134946
0.0333
0.9498
0.3113
0.2155
0.0510
-

72

Standard
Deviation
1822521
1937767
0.0356
0.5184
0.2035
0.1049
0.0420
-

Panel B. Capital Expenditures and Tobin’s Q before and after Spin-offs

Total (N=800)

Mean
Median
Keiretsu – affiliated Mean
(N=352)
Median
Non-keiretsuMean
affiliated (N=458)
Median
(Keiretsu
Difference
- Non-keiretsu)
(P-value)

Capital Expenditures to Total Asset
-2
-1
1
2
0.0430
0.0426
0.0382
0.0463
0.0383
0.0333
0.0349
0.0421
0.0394
0.0389
0.0374
0.0463
0.0393
0.0399
0.0369
0.0421
0.0449
0.0454
0.0391
0.0413
0.0336
0.0318
0.0316
0.0382
-0.0055
-0.0064
-0.0017
0.0053
(0.2156) (0.1675)
(0.7111)
(0.3941)

73

-2
1.3049
1.0760
1.3974
1.1259
1.2171
0.9924
0.1802*
(0.0774)

Tobin’s - Q
-1
1
1.0862
0.9638
0.9499
0.9273
1.1681
1.0151
1.0093
0.9351
1.0179
0.9293
0.9257
0.9230
0.1415** 0.0859*
(0.0402) (0.0586)

2
1.1072
1.0339
1.1072
1.0339
1.0392
0.9229
0.0670
(0.0392)

Table 12 Investment Sensitivity of Pre- and Post-Spin-offs
This table reports the investment sensitivity analysis results of following panel equation,
IKit = αi + β1*Qit + β2*Qit*AFTER + β2*AFTER + ∑tγt*YEARt + εit. IK is calculated as the ratio of capital expenditure to the book value of total asset. Q is Tobin’s
Q computed as the ratio of the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity to the book value of assets. AFTER is the dummy variable, which is
indicated as 1 for years -2, and -1, and 0 for years +1, and +2. ∑tγt*YEARt is year dummy variables. The numbers in parentheses below the coefficient estimates
are p-values. The sample is sub-categorized by relatedness and merger-facilitation. If the parent and subsidiaries are in the same industries, then the spin-off is
considered to be related. Merger-facilitated transactions spin-off one division and it is merged to one of existing subsidiary within the conglomerate.

Model

(1) Total

(2) Relatedness
(3) Herfindahl Index Focus
Related
Unrelated
Increasing
Non-Increasing
Tobin’s Q
0.0017
0.0035
0.0025
-0.0038
0.0118***
(0.378)
(0.2518)
(0.300)
(0.190)
(0.000)
Tobin’s Q
0.0092*
0.0229**
0.0078
0.0130*
0.0093
× After
(0.076)
(0.0206)
(0.226)
(0.064)
(0.258)
After
-0.0102
-0.0277**
-0.0071
-0.0188
-0.0038
(0.101)
(0.0218)
(0.370)
(0.431)
(0.796)
No. of Firms
244
130
114
93
65
No. of Obs.
800
425
375
331
228
R-square
0.0239
0.0316
0.0216
0.0589
0.0508
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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(4) Merger-Facilitation
Regular
Merger
0.0112**
-0.0023
(0.014)
(0.347)
0.0020
0.0100
(0.773)
(0.215)
-0.0026
-0.01215
(0.774)
(0.181)
128
116
385
415
0.1074
0.0222

Table 13 Investment Sensitivity of Pre- and Post-Spin-offs
This table reports the investment sensitivity analysis results of following panel equation,
IKit = αi + β1*Qit + β2*Qit*AFTER + β2*AFTER + ∑tγt*YEARt + εit. IK is calculated as the ratio of capital expenditure to the book value of total asset. Q is Tobin’s
Q computed as the ratio of the sum of book value of debt and market value of equity to the book value of assets. AFTER is the dummy variable, which is
indicated as 1 for years -2, and -1, and 0 for years +1, and +2. ∑tγt*YEARt is year dummy variables. The numbers in parentheses below the coefficient estimates
are p-values. The sample is sub-categorized by bank-related firm specific variables: keiretsu-affiliation, below and above sample medians of, bank loan amount
normalized by book value of total assets, and main bank ownership.

Model

(1) Keiretsu
(2) Bank Loan Amount (3) Main Bank Ownership
Affiliated
None
High
Low
High
Low
Tobin’s Q
0.0052** -0.0002
-0.0049
0.0067***
0.0018
0.0021
(0.015)
(0.961)
(0.129)
(0.008)
(0.453)
(0.545)
Tobin’s Q
0.0147** 0.0066
0.0127
0.0069
0.0107*
0.0075
× After
(0.015)
(0.391)
(0.137)
(0.302)
(0.098)
(0.401)
After
-0.0089
-0.0116
-0.0087
-0.0135
-0.0120
-0.0079
(0.211)
(0.222)
(0.352)
(0.115)
(0.133)
(0.437)
No. of Firms
105
139
120
124
137
107
No. of Obs.
352
448
394
406
451
349
R-square
0.0687
0.0141
0.0243
0.0602
0.0434
0.0311
*,**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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Table 14 Investment Sensitivity of Pre- and Post-spin-offs
This table reports the investment sensitivity analysis results of following panel equation, IKit = αi + β1*Qit + β2*Qit*AFTER + β2*AFTER + ∑tγt*YEARt + εit. IK is
calculated as the ratio of capital expenditure to the book value of total asset. Q is Tobin’s Q computed as the ratio of the sum of book value of debt and market
value of equity to the book value of assets. AFTER is the dummy variable, which is indicated as 1 for years -2, and -1, and 0 for years +1, and +2. YEARt is year
dummy variables. The numbers in parentheses below the coefficient estimates are p-values. The sample is sub-categorized by combinations of spin-offs and
bank-related firm specific variables.

Panel A. Keiretsu-Affiliation vs. Focus and Merger-Facilitated Spin-offs
Model
(1) Related
(2) Unrelated
Non-Keiretsu
Non-Keiretsu
Keiretsu
Keiretsu
Tobin’s Q
-0.0013
0.0106**
0.0041
-0.0053
(0.657)
(0.027)
(0.122)
(0.148)
Tobin’s Q
0.0281***
0.0027
0.0089
0.0072
× After
(0.001)
(0.838)
(0.230)
(0.413)
After
-0.0131
-0.0183
-0.0055
-0.0038
(0.194)
(0.228)
(0.533)
(0.729)
No. of Firms
51
80
52
61
No. of Obs.
172
257
172
199
R-square
0.1171
0.0469
0.0521
0.0227
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(3) Merger-Facilitation
Non-Keiretsu
Keiretsu
-0.0022
-0.0017
(0.369)
(0.654)
0.0202**
-0.0010
(0.016)
(0.937)
-0.0121*
-0.0103
(0.193)
(0.470)
51
65
186
229
0.0582
0.0320

(4) Regular Spin-offs
Keiretsu Non-Keiretsu
0.0066
0.0087
(0.296)
(0.160)
0.0049
-0.0009
(0.506)
(0.936)
-0.0017
-0.0038
(0.855)
(0.781)
54
76
164
227
0.0584
0.0960

Panel B. Q-dummy vs. Bank Loan Amount
Model
(1) Low Q
(2) High Q
High Bank Loan
Low Bank Loan High Bank Loan Low Bank Loan
Tobin’s Q
-0.0074
-0.0433***
0.0053
-0.0013
(0.613)
(0.000)
(0.121)
(0.774)
Tobin’s Q
0.0526**
0.0372
0.006
-0.0194
× After
(0.034)
(0.104)
(0.577)
(0.218)
After
-0.0529***
-0.0138
0.0054
0.0151
(0.009)
(0.433)
(0.729)
(0.437)
No. of Firms
51
65
54
76
No. of Obs.
186
229
164
227
R-square
0.0582
0.0320
0.0584
0.0960
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
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GENERAL CONCLUSION
We study the relationship between internal capital market and banks relationship
by examining the Japanese corporate spin-offs from 2001 through 2003 since the
establishment of new spin-offs law in Japan. The Japanese spin-off data provide a unique
environment in which we can focus on the effect of corporate restructurings on the
efficiency of internal capital markets, not confronted by the control issues.
Empirical evidence of this study shows that there are significant increase in
efficiency of internal capital markets after spin-offs; positive abnormal returns around the
announcement; significant positive market-adjusted returns after the spin-offs for 12, 24,
and 36 months; a significant increase in focus of firms in terms of the Herfindahl index; a
significant reduction in the diversification discount; and a significant increase in
investment sensitivity after the spin-off transactions. Furthermore, these increases of
internal capital market efficiency are closely related to bank relationship variables such as
keiretsu-affiliation, main bank ownership, bank loan amount, or existence of a bankappointed director. Thus, our empirical evidence suggests that there is a significant
relationship between internal capital markets and banks in Japan; the closer relationship
with banks creates shareholder wealth, increases the focus of firms, reduces the
diversification discounts, and increases the investment efficiency after the internal capital
market reorganizations through spin-offs.
In sum, our empirical evidence suggests that the efficiency of internal capital
markets in Japan increases through spin-offs. Also, banks’ monitoring roles seem to have
significant positive impacts on efficiency of internal capital markets.
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